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Abstract
We present identication and estimation results for the collectivemodel
of labour supply in which there are discrete choices, censoring of hours and
nonparticipation in employment. We derive the collective restrictions on
labour supply functions and contrast them with restrictions implied by the
usual unitary framework. Using the large changes in the wage structure
between men and women in the UK over the last two decades we estimate
a collective labor supply model for married couples without children. The
implications of the unitary framework are rejected while those of the collec-
tive approach are not. The estimates of the sharing rule show that wages
have a strong inuence on bargaining power within couples.
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1 Introduction1
The standard unitary labour supply model is unable to explain a number of em-
pirical facts. First, the assumption of income pooling, where the source of income
does not matter for household behaviour is rejected (see for instance Thomas,
1990, Duo, 2003, and the considerable literature on intrahousehold allocation).
Second, the compensated substitution e¤ects between male and female leisure,
whenever compared are found not to be symmetric. Lastly, many recent studies
have recognized that a lot of inequality may be hidden within households and the
standard unitary model cannot handle this issue by construction. Both the empir-
ical failings and intrahousehold inequality concerns lead directly to the question of
how resources are allocated within households and how this is likely to change in
response to changes in the environment.
When it comes to welfare assessment, policy evaluation and cost-benet analy-
sis, intrahousehold allocation is a crucial issue for several reasons. First, to the
extent that policy makers are interested in individual well-being, analysis focusing
on the inter-household level may be insu¢ cient, if not misleading. One can easily
nd examples in which a policy, say, slightly ameliorates the well being of poorest
households, but at the cost of a large increase in intrahousehold disparities - so
that, in the end, poorest individuals are made signicantly worse o¤. Disregarding
1Acknowledgements: We are grateful to three anonymous referees, James Dow, Francois Lais-
ney, Jim Heckman, Tom MaCurdy, John Rust and Yoram Weiss for particularly helpful com-
ments. We also thank participants at the AFSE, Carlos III, Chicago Econometrics seminar,
Concordia University (Montreal), CREST, the IFS, Nantes University, NYU, SITE 98 - Stan-
ford, and Paris-Jourdan, for their helpful comments. This research is part of the program of the
ESRC Centre for the Micro-Economic Analysis of Fiscal Policy at IFS. The nancial support of
the Alliance program, ESRC, NSF and Commissariat general du Plan is gratefully acknowledged.
Household data from the FES made available by the CSO through the ESRC Data Archive has
been used by permission of the HMSO. Neither the CSO nor the ESRC Data Archive bear re-
sponsibility for the analysis or the interpretation of the data reported here. The usual disclaimer
applies.
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these issues (or dismissing intrahousehold inequality issues as irrelevant) may thus
lead to important policy errors.
A second and more subtle problem is directly linked to a crucial insight of
bargaining theory, namely that changes in outside options may have a strong im-
pact on behavior and welfare even for agents who are not directly a¤ected by
these options. For instance, the availability of unemployment benets may a¤ect
the structure of the bargaining game between employers and employees, hence
the situation of workers who do not actually receive these benets. In the same
vein, Haddad and Kanbur (1992), analyzing the welfare impact of guaranteed em-
ployment programs in India, stress that these programs, by generating credible
outside options for women, may have a huge impact on intrahousehold allocation
and decision process. They argue that standard cost-benet analysis, which ex-
clusively concentrates on the gains received by agents who actually participate in
the program, may thus miss its major benet, leading to a biased evaluation of
its consequences. A third example, which lies at the core of the present paper,
relates to the impact on wage increases on household behavior. In the standard,
unitarymodel, wages matter insofar as they a¤ect the households budget con-
straint; when a household member is not working, changes in his/her potential
wage cannot matter. Bargaining theory, on the other hand, suggest the opposite
conclusion: if potential wages a¤ect bargaining positions (say, because a members
threat point involves participation in the labor market), then any variation of the
potential wage of an unemployed member will modify the behavior of (and the
welfare allocation within) the household.
Clearly, these issues cannot be addressed within a unitary setting; a richer
conceptual framework is needed, where individuals retain their identity within the
household and where questions of individual welfare make sense. The collective
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model of household behavior provides precisely such framework. In this paper we
use and develop further the framework of Chiappori (1988) to estimate individ-
ual preferences and within household allocation rules based on observable labour
supply decisions of the household. As suggested by the above discussion, we are
primarily interested in participation decisions in general, and the role of wages of
unemployed members in particular.
To empirically analyse these important wage e¤ects in a convincing way we
use the large changes in the wage structure between men and women over time
in the UK to provide identication of the labour supply model without relying
on arbitrary exclusion restrictions or on cross sectional variation in wages. In
this empirical implementation we have to acknowledge certain features of observed
family supply decisions. First, womens labour supply displays a wide range of
hours of work and a substantive fraction do not work. Second, that male labour
supply is discrete and does not t the continuous choice paradigm which provides
a reasonable approximation for female labour supply in couples. These features
provide a key motivation for the approach we take to modelling collective labour
supply in this paper.
Discrete versus continuous labor supply Empirical models of household
labor supply can be set up using the accumulated knowledge on empirical models
of individual, mainly female, labor supply (see Blundell & MaCurdy, 1999 for a
review). A basic lesson of this literature is the rst and foremost classication of
the huge variety of existing models into two broad categories: those involving a
continuous choices of hours and those modeling participation as a discrete choice.
The choices between these two options can be driven by various motives. First,
data may or may not exhibit the wide range of di¤erent individual number of
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hours that is required to identify a continuous model.2 Secondly, when allowing
for xed costs, demand constraints or any other regulations in the labor market,
observing participation and hours of work lead to inferences on di¤erent parameters
(at the cost of other identifying restrictions). Thirdly, the continuous nature of
hours of work can also be irrelevant if all that matters, for institutional reasons,
is the choice between full time and non participation or full time, part time and
non participation. Finally, and more importantly (at least for our purpose), the
econometrician may be primarily interested in assessing some aspects of labor
supply for which participation decisions are of central importance. As discussed
above, an important motivation of our research is to disentangle the bargaining
aspects involved in participation decisions from the more standard income and
substitution e¤ects. A careful study of non participation is crucial in this respect,
because the e¤ect of changes in the potential wage of a non participating member
provides key insights on the bargaining process.
When analyzing labor supply decisions of couples, the econometrician can al-
locate households into four di¤erent regimes, dened by the interaction of par-
ticipation decisions of both spouses. Empirically, the information of interest is
summarized by two participation frontiersbetween regimes of participation for
both members, as functions of any relevant covariates. Moreover, conditional on
participation, labor supply functions provides additional information. Clearly, the
four regimes are not equally informative in terms of both testability and identi-
cation. For instance, not much in terms of additional identifying power should be
expected when considering the sample of households where both spouses do not
work, since there are no other pieces of information on behavior in this regime. At
the other extreme, the regime in which both spouses work has already been stud-
2This is the case in many di¤erent countries at least in Europe, such as France and to an
extent in the US.
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ied in the theoretical literature, from both a unitary and a collective perspective
(Chiappori, 1988, 1992). This is the case where one should expect the strongest
identifying power for preferences and any other function of interest (such as sharing
rules), provided that we can condition the empirical analysis on the participation
decisions.
It is only recently that other work regimes have been investigated; and this
paper was the rst to propose such an analysis.3 Our study is based on survey
data (UK FES) over a long time span - one of the few long term surveys that
allows for an empirical analysis of this type. As noted above these data display
two important features. First a large proportion of women do not work; when
they do, however, the range of hours that they supply is large. We thus have to
discuss the implications of the collective framework when a good is on the corner.
Second, although non-participation rates for men are large and approaching those
for women over time, when men do work, they nearly always work full time. In
our data set practically no men are seen to work for less than 35 hours a week and
very few are seen to work for less than 52 weeks. As we illustrate in the empirical
section, modelling the small variation of hours above 35 hours a week or below 52
weeks a year does not seem to us to be the most important issue to focus on.
These characteristics of the data lead to the basic methodological choices of
our paper. Namely, we assume that the husbands decision is discrete (work or
not) and that only this dimension of labor supply choice a¤ects preferences. The
collective framework we present thus breaks new ground. First, identication can-
not rely on both labour supplies being continuous. Second, female labour supply
is shown to vary with male wages even when he is not working, although this rela-
tionship operates in a restrictive way that can be tested. Third, our extension of
3For a related work, see Donni (forthcoming).
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the collective approach to discrete choices relies on an original assumption of dou-
ble indi¤erence towards labour market participation; we explore the theoretical
foundations and the empirical consequences of this formalization on the collective
approach, and in particular on the way intrahousehold allocation of resources op-
erates in the neighbourhood of the participation frontiers. Finally, our model is
not nested in the collective model with continuous hours (Chiappori, 1988) and
thus extends the generality of the collective approach.
Identication >From an econometric point of view we recognise the importance
of unobserved heterogeneity, which in itself creates further di¢ cult identication
questions. We cannot analyze identication in each regime of participation as
in the original homogenous case of Chiappori (1988) as new selection and other
endogeneity issues arise. We discuss estimation within the context of parametric
preference structures (i.e. linear or log-linear) and we show in the working paper
version that given the functional form assumptions and exclusion restrictions, the
restrictions originating from the collective framework overidentify the model in a
semi-parametric way.4 For simplicity, we use full parametric assumptions in the
empirical analysis.
The framework we develop allows identication of preferences without using
information on preferences for singles; preferences are fully marriage specic, i.e.
we allow all parameters of the utility function to depend on whether one is married
or not. A natural interpretation is that (i) marriage has a value(in utility terms)
per se, in the sense that, apart from any public good issue, married people can
derive a higher degree of well-being from the same level of consumption (there is a
utility of being married), and (ii) that marriage may change individual preferences,
4Working paper with proofs and detailed discussions of many of the issues is available at
http://www.ifs.org.uk/workingpapers/wp0119.pdf
7
in the sense that one persons trade-o¤ between, say, leisure and consumption
typically depend on whether the person is married. The surprising result, in this
context, is that the collective framework implies restrictions on household labor
supply, even when male labor supply is discrete. Modelling household formation
and dissolution and identifying the way that marriage a¤ects preferences is of
course another issue of critical importance. It is beyond the scope of this paper,
although we view the present contribution as a crucial step in this direction.
In this paper we use UK survey data (FES) for the years 1978 to 2001. We
select only couples without children because we do not allow for public goods
or for household production in the theoretical model we consider. Individuals
can care about each others welfare, but not by the way in which this welfare is
generated. These restrictions would be particularly stringent in the presence of
children, where the decisions on how many resources should be devoted to them is
of central importance and is reected in day to day ows in consumption. A clear
implication is that our results are only directly valid for this group of individuals.
However, this is a valuable rst step in our attempt to construct empirical models
in the more complex context of the collective models.
Main ndings Exploiting the large changes in the wage structure in the UK
to provide identication in itself distinguishes us from many other papers. Our
results show that the unitary model is rejected; however the collective model is
not rejected. In the collective model, the estimated female labor supply wage
(respectively income) elasticity at mean wages is 0.66 (resp. -0.73) and these
results conform well with previous results where the analysis is conditioned on the
male working.
In addition, new and interesting patterns emerge. Of particular interest, given
the motivations stated above, is the nding that female labor supply depends on
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male wage even when the husband is not working. Moreover, the direction of this
relationship goes exactly as predicted by a bargaining interpretation of the col-
lective model. A male wage increase when he is working expands the households
total income, which in general benets both members;5 through a standard income
e¤ect, female number of hours should be reduced, which is what we nd. On the
contrary, a male wage increase when he is idle has no impact on the households
budget constraint, but inuences the intrahousehold distribution of power. Indeed,
we nd that such an increase augments her working time, which suggest a reallo-
cation of household resources in his favor. This result conrms the basic insights
described above.
Finally, the estimation of the sharing rule implies that bargaining power is
strongly a¤ected by wages. One pound increase in his earnings when he is working
increases his consumption by about 0.81 of a pound, while he gets to keep 0.67
of an increase in unearned income. When he does not work all these e¤ects get
compressed by to 68% of their values implying a greater shift of marginal resources
to the wife.
Literature There are relatively few empirical studies of family labor supply out-
side the unitary model. A number of more recent studies have used micro data to
evaluate the pooling hypothesis or to recover collective preferences using exclusive
goods, but these studies typically look at private consumption rather than labor
supply. For example, Thomas (1990) nds evidence against the pooling hypothesis
by carefully examining household data from Brazil. Browning et al. (1996) use
Canadian household expenditure data to examine the pooling hypothesis and to
recover the derivatives of the sharing rule. Clothing in this analysis is the exclusive
good providing identication, rather than labor supply which is problematical for
5See Chiappori and Donni (2005) for a precise analysis of this issue.
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a sample of couples without children who both work full-time.
Recent empirical studies concerning family labor supply include Lundberg (1988),
Apps and Rees (1996), Kapteyn and Kooreman (1992) and Fortin and Lacroix
(1997). Each of these aim to provide a test of the unitary model and to recover
some parameters of collective preferences. Lundberg attempts to see which types
of households, distinguished by demographic composition, come close to satisfying
the hypotheses implied by the unitary model. The other three studies take this
a step further by directly specifying and estimating labor supply equations from
a collective specication. Apps and Rees (1996) specify a model to account for
household production. Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990) use data on preferred hours
of work to separately identify individual from collective preferences and, conse-
quently, to identify the utility weight. Fortin and Lacroix (1997) follow closely the
Chiappori framework and allow the utility weight to be a function of individual
wages and unearned incomes. They use a functional form that nests both the
unitary and the collective model as particular cases, and nd that the restrictions
implied by the unitary setting are strongly rejected, while the collective ones are
not. In a more recent paper, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) extend the
collective model to allow for distribution factors, dened as any variable that is
exogenous with respect to preferences but may inuence the decision process. Us-
ing PSID data and choosing the sex ratio as a distribution factor, they nd that
the restrictions implied by the collective model are not rejected; furthermore, they
identify the intra-household sharing rule as a function of wages, non labor income
and the sex ratio. It is important to note that the latter works assume that both
male and female labor supplies vary continuously. The case of discrete male labor
supply, which raises particular di¢ culties, is a specic contribution of the current
paper; however, Donni (forthcoming) applies similar ideas to taxation. Of course,
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there are issues that we do not address; these include uncertainty, intertemporal
considerations, taxation and others. Some work has been carried out by Mazzocco
(2003a and b, 2004), Attanasio and Mazzocco (2001) and Donni (forthcoming).
More is left for future research in this important eld, which can build on our
framework.6
We set up the homogenous model in Section 2 and discuss its identication, the
collective restrictions and the corresponding restrictions in the unitary model. In
Section 3, we specify the empirical model, report estimates and tests of unitary and
collective restrictions. We present estimates of the sharing rule and labour supply
functions when he works or not. In our nal section we discuss how the model can
be generalized to take into account of household production and public goods. We
draw on work we have been developing to discuss some new identication results
as well as data requirements for this more general problem.
2 Theoretical Framework
We now present the collective model for male and female labour supply, with
discrete male labour supply.7 We then show how, given wages, other income and
possible other exogenous variables, we can recover individual preferences and the
sharing rule, from observations on labour supply of each individual. Our analysis
is based on the assumption that within household allocations are e¢ cient. This
implies, among other things, that side-payments are possible. We view this as quite
a natural assumption to make when modeling relationships of married individuals.
It turns out that, when preferences are egoistic or caring, this assumption is an
6Udry (1996) studies a related problem, namely the allocation of inputs to agricultural pro-
duction in a developing country. He concludes that the decision process entails ine¢ ciencies,
in the sense that a di¤erent allocation between male and female crops could increase total
production.
7The analysis assumes that unemployment is a labour supply decision.
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identifying one.8 Preferences are dened over goods and non-market time. In
the basic model, we assume that both these goods are private, and that there is
no household production. The extension to account for household production is
discussed in the concluding section of the paper where we also consider the case
of public consumption. Although some of the assumptions underlying the basic
model are restrictive, we think of it as best applying to the population of married
couples with no children; children are likely to be the most important source of
preference interdependence, which we choose to exclude for the moment.
The original Chiappori (1988) theorem relied on the idea that when allocations
are e¢ cient (as assumed) the marginal rates of substitution between members in
a household are equalized. In our case, in which there is censoring and where one
of the individuals faces discrete choice for one of the goods, the derivation of the
implications of the collective setting has to follow a di¤erent logic. In what follows
below we present the model and its assumptions formally and derive restrictions
on labor supply functions. We nish the section by deriving similar restrictions of
the unitary model.
2.1 The General Collective Labor Supply Model
2.1.1 Preferences and decision process
We consider a labor supply model within a two-member household; let hi
and Ci denote member is labor supply (with i = m; f and 0  hi  1) and
consumption of a private Hicksian commodity C (with Cf+Cm = C ) respectively.
The price of the consumption good is set to one. We assume preferences to be
egoistictype; i.e., member is utility can be written U i(1   hi; Ci), where U i is
8Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2002) show that e¢ ciency alone
(with general preferences) cannot provide testable restrictions upon behavior unless the number
of commodities is at least 5; in addition, even with more than four commodities preferences are
not identiable.
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continuously di¤erentiable, strictly monotone and strongly quasi-concave.9 Also,
let wf ; wm and y denote wages and the households non labor income respectively.
A common assumption in previous works on collective labor supply (Chiappori,
1988, 1992; Fortin and Lacroix, 1997; Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002) was
that both labor supplies could vary continuously in response to uctuations in
wages and non labor income. If hm and hf are twice di¤erentiable functions of
wages and non labor income, then generically, the observation of hm and hf allows
to test the collective setting and to recover individual preferences and individual
consumptions of the private good up to an additive constant (Chiappori, 1988).
Empirically, however, the continuity assumption is di¢ cult to maintain. As shown
in the empirical section, while female labor supply varies in a fairly continuous
manner, male labor supply is essentially dichotomous. A rst purpose of this
paper is precisely to show that the collective model implies restrictions in the
case where one labor supply is constrained to take only two values.10 Hence we
assume throughout the paper that member f can freely choose her working hours,
while member m can only decide to participate (then hm = 1) or not (hm = 0).
Let P denote the participation set, i.e., the set of wage-income bundles such that
m does participate. Similarly, N denotes the non-participation set, and L is the
participation frontier between P and N .
As the household is assumed to take Pareto-e¢ cient decisions, there exists for
any (wf ; wm; y), some um(wf ; wm; y) such that (hi; Ci) is a solution to the program:
9The utility functions can be of the caring type: Each individual may care about the overall
welfare of their partner, so long as they do not care about how it comes about.
10This set-up is not nested and does not nest the continuous model since choice sets are
di¤erent. The analysis could easily be extended to any discrete labor supply function; for instance,
the choice might be between non activity, part-time or full-time work. In our data, however, male
part-time work is negligeable.
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max
hf ;hm;Cf ;Cm
U f [1  hf ; Cf ] (1)
Um [1  hm; Cm]  um(wf ; wm; y)
C = wf :h
f + wm:h
m + y
0  hf  1; hm 2 f0; 1g
The function um(wf ; wm; y) denes the level of utility that member m can com-
mand when the relevant exogenous variables take the values wf ; wm; y though the
analysis can be conditioned on any other exogenous variable. Underlying the de-
termination of um is some allocation mechanism (such as a bargaining model) that
leads to Pareto e¢ cient allocations. We do not need to be explicit about such a
mechanism; hence the collective model does not rely on specic assumptions about
the precise way that couples share resources.
Also, note that, in general, we allow um to depend on the husbands wage even
when the latter does not work. The idea, here, is that within a bargaining context,
his threat point may well depend on the wage he would receive if he chose to work.
If so, most cooperative equilibrium concepts will imply that um is a function of both
wages and non labor income; in each case, indeed, a change in one of the threat
points does modify the outcome. Regarding non-cooperative models of bargaining,
various situations are possible. In some cases, for instance, the outcome does not
depend on the threat points, which rules out any dependence of this kind. More
interesting is the suggestion of MacLeod and Malcomson(1993), where the outcome
of the relationship remains constant when the threat points are modied, unless one
individual rationality constraint becomes binding; then the agreement is modied
so that the resulting outcome followsthe members reservation utility along the
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Pareto frontier.11 In our context, this implies that among all households where m
is not working, only some will exhibit the dependence on ms wage. Finally, note
that preferences (and the Pareto weights) are allowed to depend on taste shifter
variables, such as age etc.
2.1.2 The participation decision: who gains, who looses?
In the standard, unitary framework, the participation decision is modeled in terms
of a reservation wage. At this wage, the agent is exactly indi¤erent between work-
ing and not working. Generalizing this property to our setting is however tricky,
since now two people are involved. The most natural generalization of the stan-
dard model is to dene the reservation wage by the fact that one member (say,
the member at stake, here the husband) is indi¤erent between working and not
working. An important remark is that, in this case, Pareto e¢ ciency requires that
both members are indi¤erent. To see why, assume that the wife is not indi¤erent
say she experiences a strict loss if the husband does not participate. Take any
wage innitesimally below the reservation wage, and consider the following change
in the decision process: the husband does work, and receives " more (of the con-
sumption good) than previously planned. The husband is better o¤, since he was
indi¤erent and he receives the additional "; and if " is small enough, the wife is
better o¤ too, since the " loss in consumption is more than compensated by the
discrete gain due to his participation.
In the remainder, we shall use the double indi¤erenceassumption, that can
be formally stated as follows:
11This will typically be the case for a generalization of the Nash bargaining concept to the
case in which the relationship is non binding, in the sense that each member may at each period
choose to leave. See Ligon (2002) for an axiomatic approach of dynamic Nash bargaining in a
household context.
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Denition and Lemma DI (double indi¤erence): The participation
frontier L is such that member m is indi¤erent between participating or not. Pareto
e¢ ciency then implies that f is indi¤erent as well.
Technically, this amounts to assuming that in the program (1) above, um is a
continuous function of both wages and non labor income. Natural as it may seem,
this continuity assumption still restricts the set of possible behavior (and, as such,
plays a key role for deriving restrictions).
A possible, quite general interpretation is that the household rst agrees on
some general rulethat denes, for each possible price-income bundle, the par-
ticular (e¢ cient) allocation of welfare across members that will prevail. Then this
rule is implemented through specic choices, including ms decision to partic-
ipate. Although the latter is assumed discrete, it cannot, by assumption, lead
to discontinuous changes in each members welfare, in the neighbourhood of the
participation frontier; on the contrary, the participation frontier will be dened
precisely as the locus of the price-income bundles such that ms drop in leisure,
when participating, can be compensated exactly by a discontinuous increase in
consumption that preserves smoothness of each members well-being.
The double indi¤erence assumption can be justied from an individualistic
point of view. That both members should be indi¤erent sounds like a natural
requirement, especially in a context where compensations are easy to achieve via
transfers of the consumption good. Conversely, a participation decision entailing
a strict loss for one member is likely to be very di¢ cult to implement; all the more
when the loss is experienced by the member who is supposed to start working.
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2.1.3 The sharing rules
It is well known that Pareto optima can be decentralized in an economy of
this kind. Just as in Chiappori (1992), this property denes the central concept of
the sharing rule. The important distinction here is that the decision of one of the
members is discrete: the male can only decide to work or not.
Participation: Let us rst consider the case whenm does participate. His utility
is thus Um (Cm; 0), and we have that :
Um (Cm; 0) = um(wf ; wm; y) (2)
Solving for consumption cm we obtain
Cm = V m [um(wf ; wm; y)] = 	(wf ; wm; y)
where V m is the inverse of the mapping Um (:; 0). Function 	(wf ; wm; y) is called
the sharing rule. Now, Pareto e¢ ciency is equivalent to fs behavior being a
solution of the program:
max
hf ;Cf
U f [1  hf ; Cf ] (3)
Cf = wf :h
f + y + wm  	(wf ; wm; y)
0  hf  1
This generates a labor supply of the form :
hf (wf ; wm; y) = H
f [wf ; y + wm  	(wf ; wm; y)] (4)
where Hf is the Marshallian labor supply function associated to U f which can be
equal to zero if a corner solution arises.
A rst consequence is that, for any (wf ; wm; y) 2 P such that hf (wf ; wm; y) > 0:
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1 	wm
1 	y =
hfwm
hfy
=A(wf ; wm; y) (5)
Note that, in the absence of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, the func-
tion hf , and hence the ratio A, are empirically observable. Hence (5) provides a
rst restriction of 	.
Non participation: We now consider the non participation case. Then males
utility is Um (Cm; 1), and we have that :
Um (Cm; 1) = um(wf ; wm; y) = V
 1
m (	(wf ; wm; y)) (6)
which can be inverted in :
Cm = Wm

V  1m (	(wf ; wm; y))

= F (	(wf ; wm; y)) (7)
where Wm is the inverse of the mapping Um (:; 1) and where F = Wm  (V m) 1 is
increasing because both V m and Wm are increasing.
As before, fs decision program leads to a labor supply of the form :
hf (wf ; wm; y) = H
f [wf ; y   F (	(wf ; wm; y))] (8)
and, for any (wf ; wm; y) 2 N such that hf (wf ; wm; y) > 0:
 F 0	wm
1  F 0	y =
hfwm
hfy
=B(wf ; wm; y) (9)
Note that in contrast to the unitary model fs labor supply will depend on ms
(potential) wage even when m is not working, because the decision process will
vary with wm:12
It should nally be stressed that the function A (respectively B) is dened only
on P (respectively N); i.e. for the set of wages and non-labor incomes for which
12See Neary and Roberts (1980) on shadow prices when a good is at a corner.
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the male works (does not work). Moreover functions A and B are only dened
when the female works.
2.1.4 The participation decision
The participation frontier L is dened by the set of wages and non-labor
income bundles (wf ; wm; y) 2 L, for which m is indi¤erent between participating
or not:
Lemma 1 The participation frontier L is characterized by
8(wf ; wm; y) 2 L; 	(wf ; wm; y)  F (	(wf ; wm; y)) = wm (10)
Proof. Since, on L, f is also indi¤erent between m participating or not partici-
pating, it must be the case that fs income does not change discontinuously in the
neighborhood of the frontier. Since total income does change in a discontinuous
way (net increase of wm when m participates), it must be the case that the whole
gain goes to m.
The Lemma shows that at the participation frontier all additional income from
participation goes to m to compensate him for the discrete increase in his labour
supply. This is a property that depends on all goods being private and may not
hold in the presence of public goods as we discuss in the last section -(Extensions)
To parameterize L, we choose to use a shadow wage condition; i.e., m partici-
pates if and only if
wm > (wf ; y)
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for some ; that describes the frontier. Note that this reservation wage property
does not stem from the theoretical set-up as in standard labor supply models, but
has to be postulated. This will be true if (10) has a unique solution for wm, a
su¢ cient condition for which is that it is a contraction mapping:13
Assumption R : The sharing rules are such that
8(wf ; wm; y); j[1  F 0(	(wf ; wm; y)] :	wm(wf ; wm; y)j < 1 (11)
In this case whenever hf > 0,  is characterized by the following equation :
8(wf ; y); 	(wf ; (wf ; y); y))  F (	(wf ; (wf ; y); y)) = (wf ; y) (12)
which implies:
(	y + y	wm) =
y
(1  F 0) (13)
	wf =
wf
y
	y
In the second equation, the relative e¤ect of wf and y on the participation frontier
is equal to their relative e¤ect in the sharing rule since it is only through that
function that those variables a¤ect male participation. In contrast, in the rst
equation, it is the absolute level of the e¤ect of y that allows identication of
the rst derivative of the utility di¤erence (F 0) conditional on the sharing rule.
Equations (5) and (9) complete the system as shown next.
13In words consider the increase in ms consumption resulting from an innitesimal increase
dwm in ms wage . When m is participating, dwm increases both the household income and ms
bargaining power, while the rst e¤ect does not operate when m does not participate. Let dcm
denote the consumption change in the former case, and dcm in the latter. Then (11) states that
the di¤erence dcm   dcm cannot be more than the initial increase dwm.
20
2.1.5 Restrictions from the Collective Model
What are the restrictions implied by the collective setting just described
with private consumption? And is it possible to recover the structural model - i.e.,
preferences and the sharing rules - from observed behavior ?
Proposition 2 Under the conditions listed in the Appendix
(i) the collective model with private commodities leads to restrictions on house-
hold behavior. In particular on the frontier when she participates (i.e. for the set
of wf ; wm and y such that wm = (wf ; y) and hf > 0) we have that
 	wm + A	y = A  1
 	wm +B	y =
B
F 0
y	wm +	y =
y
(1 F 0)
	wf =
wf
y
	y
(14)
(ii) the preferences and the sharing rules can be recovered up to an additive
constant everywhere where hf > 0:
Proof: (i) We have assumed that um(wf ; wm; y) is continuously di¤erentiable
everywhere. It follows that both (5) and (9) are valid on the frontier as well. Hence,
on the frontier, using (5), (9) and (13) the sharing rule is determined by (14).
(ii) The proof follows in stages. First we consider the restrictions which recover
the sharing rule and F 0 on the participation frontier. This is followed by a proof
of identication outside the frontier. Identication of preferences then follows. See
Appendix. Below we use these restrictions to derive direct tests of the collective
model.
These conditions can be interpreted as follows. The rst condition is standard
in the collective framework; it expresses the fact that when he is working, his
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wage a¤ects her labor supply only through an income e¤ect. The second condition
reects the structural stability implied by the collective setting. It states that
what is determined by the couples decision process is the utility um(wf ; wm; y)
he would reach for each wage-income bundle; this utility level being implemented
by di¤erent consumption levels depending on whether he works or not. Finally,
the last two conditions reect the double indi¤erenceproperty; they state that
the participation frontier is such that both he and she are indi¤erent between his
working and not working.
2.2 Unitary Model Restrictions
In the previous sections, we have derived the conditions that the labor supply
functions of the female f and the participation frontier of the male m must satisfy
to be compatible with the collective setting, when all goods are private. We now
contrast this result to the unitary framework and discuss the extent to which the
two models provide di¤erent predictions and testable implications that would allow
us to discriminate between the two hypotheses. Here, the household, as a whole,
is assumed to maximize some unique utility function UH , subject to the standard
budget constraint :
max
hf ;hm;C
UH [1  hm; 1  hf ; C] (15)
C = wf :h
f + wm:h
m + y
0  hf  1; hm 2 f0; 1g
Two points are worth mentioning here:
 We do not impose separability. This means that the households preferences
for fs leisure and total consumption may in general depend on whether m
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is working or not. Let V W and V N (respectively. hfW and h
f
N) denote the
corresponding indirect utility functions when he works and when he does not
( respectively female labor supply).
 Preferences, here, only depend on total consumption C ; we do not introduce
Cf and Cm independently. This is a direct consequence of Hicks composite
commodity theorem: since Cf and Cm have identical prices, they cannot be
identied in this general setting.
When she participates (hf > 0), one can immediately derive two restrictions,
namely :
@hfW
@wm
=
@hfW
@y
Male Works (16)
and
@hfN
@wm
= 0 Male does not Work (17)
These are standard restrictions in the unitary context. Equation (16) is the
income poolingproperty : when ms number of hours (conditional on participa-
tion) are constrained, then a change in wm can only have an income e¤ect upon fs
labor supply. Equation (17), on the other hand, reects the fact that the income
e¤ect of ms wage must be zero when he is not working.
Finally,ms participation decision depends on the di¤erence between the house-
holds (indirect) utility when he is working and when he is not :
hm = 1, V W (wf ; y + wm)  V N (wf ; y)
In particular, the participation frontier is characterized by :
V W (wf ; y +  (wf ; y)) = V
N (wf ; y)
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Di¤erentiating and using Roys identity gives that, on the frontier :
@
@wf
= hfN   hfW + hfN
@
@y
(18)
The last term on the right hand side corresponds to a standard income e¤ect: a
marginal increase dwf of female wage has the same rst order e¤ect upon partici-
pation as an increase of household non labor income equal to hfNdwf . In addition,
it also a¤ects the cost of male participation due to the reduction of female working
time; this corresponds to the term in hfN   hfW .
We can summarize these ndings as follows :
Proposition 3 The functions ; hfP and h
f
N are compatible with the unitary model
if and only if conditions (16), (17) and (18) are satised.
2.3 The separable unitary model
To conclude this discussion we ask what happens when, within the unitary
setting, we introduce the same separability assumption as in the collective case?
Formally, this amounts to assuming that
UH [1  hm; 1  hf ; Cm; Cf ] = UH [Um (1  hm; Cm) ; U f  1  hf ; Cf]
where Um and U f are interpreted as individual utility functions. Note that, in
this case, one can introduce Cm and Cf (instead of their sum), since the Hicksian
composite good theorem no longer applies (see Chiappori (1988) for a precise
statement).
In principle, this is a particular case of both the unitary model (since it cor-
responds to the maximization of a unique utility) and the collective model (since
maximizing UH under budget constraint obviously generates Pareto e¢ cient out-
comes). The problem, however, is that the form is now very strongly constrained.
24
To see how, consider the assumption made above that, on the Pareto frontier, both
members are indi¤erent between participation and non participation. This need
not be the case here; Interpreting the utility function from the perspective of the
collective model, the maximization of UH may, and will in general, lead to partic-
ipation decisions where one member is a strict loser, this loss being compensated
(at the household level, as summarized by UH) by a strict gain for the spouse.14
The key intuition is that, within the unitary setting, the marginal utility of in-
come, as evaluated at the household level, is equated across members. This by no
means implies that utility levels are compensated in any sense. One can expect
that the additional income generated by the husbands participation will be par-
tially distributed to the wife, who, because of the standard income e¤ect, will both
work less and consume more. This need not always be the case, though, because
the husbands marginal utility of consumption is modied when he participates
(unless, of course, his preferences are separable in leisure and consumption). But,
in any case, there is no reason to expect bilateral indi¤erence.
This provides an interesting illustration of the restrictive nature of the uni-
tary model. From an individualistic point of view, that both members should be
indi¤erent sounds like a natural requirement, especially in a context where com-
pensations are easy to achieve via transfers of the consumption good. Conversely,
a participation decision entailing a strict loss for one member is likely to be very
di¢ cult to implement. As it turns out, however, assuming a constant utility func-
tion essentially forbids an assumption of this kind; the model is not exible enough
with respect to the decision process to allow for such extensions.
14Of course within the unitary model it does not make sense to talk about gainers and loosers
within the household, since the unit is the household and not its members.
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3 Estimating Family Labor Supply
3.1 Data
The data we use is drawn from the UK Family Expenditure Surveys from 1978
to the rst quarter of 2001 inclusive. We restrict attention to households where
both the male and the female are below 60 and the male over 22. We further
restrict the sample to include households where the female is over 35. This allows
us to focus on those households whose children have either left or who are unlikely
to have children rather than on households who may still be planning children.
We exclude the self-employed, since their hours of work are not measured.15 The
analysis should be viewed as pertaining to this sub-population. All monetary
values are deated by the UK retail price index and are expressed in 2001 prices.
3.2 Specication and Identifying assumptions
The discussion up to now set up the model without unobserved heterogeneity.
Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity together with nonparticipation complicates
matters and raises the issue of identiability of the model from available data. The
complications are compounded by the fact that preference heterogeneity will also
reect itself in the sharing rule. This is why, building upon the empirical labor
supply literature (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999), we write a simple but already
rich model where all structural functions (labour supply and sharing rule) are semi-
log linear and additive in the heterogeneity terms and where wages are endogenous.
In estimation we assume that the vector of random terms are multivariate normal.16
15Other selections to eliminate extreme outliers and inuential observations are the following:
We exclude all those who report leaving full time education before 10 years of age, all those
with asset income of more than £ 1000 a week in real terms and all those whose total nondurable
consumption per week is £ 1000 a week below total household weekly earnings.
16In the working paper version we show that the model is semiparametrically identied i.e.
given the exclusion restrictions and a joint iid assumption for the vector of errors no distributional
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We discuss the exclusion restrictions in the empirical analysis below.
We now write the equations of female hours, male participation and male and
female wages. These equations are semi-structuralin the sense that the sharing
rule has been replaced by its expression as a function of wages, income and other
exogenous variables though wages are endogenous.
3.2.1 Female hours of work:
A semi-log specication for female labour supply is a popular form to use on British
data (see Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) for example) and is never rejected
by our data. Interaction e¤ects have not proved to be important. Thus we write
hfit = A
f
0t + Amw
m
it + Af logw
f
it + Ayyit+
A4educ
f
it + A5age
f
it + A6educ
m
it + A7age
m
it + u1it
(19)
where f denotes female and m denotes male, wfit denotes the hourly wage rate
for the female and wmit denotes the weekly earning for the male, yit denotes other
household (non-labor) income. We use the level of male earnings, rather than the
log, since this allows us to nest the income pooling hypothesis, where Am = Ay:
The variable educi denotes education of member i, measured as the age that the
person left full time education. Note that preferences are allowed to depend on
the age and education of both partners as well as on cohort (or equivalently time
e¤ects as expressed by the inclusion of Af0t). These factors may a¤ect preferences
for work directly, or indirectly through the sharing rule.
The parameters of the labor supply function will be di¤erent, depending on
whether the male is working or not. Let (19) represent the labor supply function
assumption is required. See http://www.ifs.org.uk/workingpapers/wp0119.pdf
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when the male is working. When he is not, the labor supply function is given by:
hfit = a
f
0t + amw
m
it + af logw
f
it + ayyit+
d0t + a4educ
f
it + a5age
f
it + a6educ
m
it + a7age
m
it + u0it
(20)
3.2.2 Male participation:
The latent index for male participation is also assumed semi-log linear:
pmit = b
m
pt + b
m
mw
m
it + b
m
f logw
f
it + b
m
y yit+
4educ
f
it + 5age
f
it + 6educ
m
it + 7age
m
it + u
m
it
(21)
where pmit is positive for male participants and negative (or zero) otherwise.
One can solve simply for wmit when p
m
it = 0 to derive the male reservation
earnings and the parameters of the frontier of participation. These are:
f =  
bmf
bmm
y =  
bmy
bmm
: (22)
Because of the sharing rule the male participation equation and the two female
labor supply equations will depend, in general, on the same set of variables.
3.2.3 Wage equations:
We take a standard human capital approach to wages. However, we do not restrict
the relative prices of the various components of human capital to remain constant
over time. Hence
wmit = 
m
0t + 
m
1teduc
m
it + 
m
2tage
m
it + 
m
2t(age
m
it )
2 + umwit
logwfit = 
f
0t + 
f
1teduc
f
it + 
f
2tage
f
it + 
f
2t(age
f
it)
2 + ufwit
(23)
Note that wages do not depend on the characteristics of the partner. All coe¢ cients
are time varying reecting changes in the aggregate price of each component of
human capital.
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3.2.4 Non-labor income
We measure non-labor income as the di¤erence between consumption and total
household earnings, i.e. yit = consumption wfithfit wmit pmit . This approach reduces
measurement error and accounts for sources of wealth that we do not observe
but that matter for individual decisions, including pension wealth (see Blundell
and Walker, 1986 and Blundell, Duncan and Meghir, 1998 amongst others). This
measure of unearned income is treated as endogenous and we use predictions based
on the reduced form equation,
yit = 
y
0t + 
y
1teduc
y
it + 
y
2tage
m
it + 
y
3t(age
m
it )
2 + y4tage
f
it + 
y
5t(age
f
it)
2
+ay6tit + a
y
7t
2
it + a
y
8t
2
it +
3X
k=1
ay8+k1 (it   sk > 0) (it   sk)3 + ay121 (it > 0) + uyit
where it is asset income not including any welfare payments or other government
transfers. Thus the instrument used here is asset income interacted with time (see
the time varying coe¢ cients) as well as education and age interacted with time
as above. We have included the polynomial and spline terms in it as well as an
indicator for non-zero asset income to improve the t of this reduced form.
3.2.5 Stochastic specication and exclusion restrictions
We assume that all error terms (uf1it; u
f
0it; u
m
it ; u
m
wit; u
f
wit; uyit) are jointly condi-
tionally normal with constant variance (and independent of education, age, other
income and time). The basic exclusion restriction written in the labour supply
equations above is that education-time interactions and age-time interactions are
excluded from these equations, implying that di¤erences in the preferences and the
sharing rule across education groups remain constant over time. Hence, identi-
cation of labour supply of both partners does not rely on excluding education. It
relies on the way that the returns to education have changed (see, Blundell, Dun-
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can and Meghir, 1998). The rank condition for identication is that wages have
changed di¤erentially across education groups over time. That they have done so
in the UK is a well established fact (for men see Gosling, Machin and Meghir,
2000).
In addition we need to assume that any changes in the institutional framework
has not a¤ected the sharing rule or the composition of those households. The
changing structure of benets in particular can a¤ect the structure of the sharing
rule, since it changes the outside option for the two partners. If this is the case
then the cohort-time-education interactions would not be excludable. It is part
of our identifying assumptions that the sharing rule (as well as preferences) have
not changed di¤erentially across these groups. One key concern may be changes
in the divorce laws. The most important change in the law came in 1969 nine
years before the start of our data. This had an immediate and large impact on the
number of divorces. However since the start of our sample divorces have remained
more or less constant. Nevertheless we still need to assume that other institutional
changes have not changed preferences and sharing rules di¤erentially across edu-
cation groups. However, we do allow for a general time e¤ects in preferences and
the sharing rule by including time dummies in the model, as well as permanent
di¤erences across education groups.
3.2.6 Restrictions from the Collective and Unitary Models
Using the family labor supply specication (19), (20) and (22), the restrictions
on the collective model derived from Proposition 1 may be written (see working
paper)
Am am
Ay ay =   1y (I)
Af af
Ay ay =
f
y
(II)
(24)
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It is interesting to contrast these restrictions with the structural restrictions
that would be derived in the unitary case. Using the same notation (upper and
lower cases for the two regimes), we have to impose equations (16), (17) and (18)
on the frontier (wm = f logwf + yy + zz). The rst two yield:
Am = Ay (I)
am = 0 (II)
(25)
Using (18), the denition of the frontier and these two restrictions give:
f = (1 + y)(af logwf + ayy)  (Af logwf + Ay(y + wm))
As this equation is valid only on the frontier for any wf and y, it is also an
equation of the frontier. Therefore, the following vectors are colinear:0@ 1 f
 y
1A ;
0@  Ay(1 + y)af   Af
(1 + y)ay   Ay
1A
Hence in the unitary model we have two additional restrictions, namely: 
1 + y

(ay   Ay) = 0 (I)
Ayf = (1 + y)af   Af : (II)
(26)
3.3 Estimation
First we estimate two reduced form participation equations: One for men and one
for women. These are obtained by substituting out the wages from the structural
participation equations. The resulting equations have the form
pkit = 
k
0t + 
k
1teduc
f
it + 
k
2tage
f
it + 
k
3t(age
f
it)
2+
k4teduc
m
it + 
k
5tage
m
it + (
k
6tage
m
it )
2 + k7tyit + v
k
it; k = m; f
(27)
Thus we include all variables that determine wages of men and women as well as
other income yit, and we allow the coe¢ cients to change over time. The changes in
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the coe¢ cients for variables that determine wages reect the changing coe¢ cients
in the wage equations.17
We then estimate the female log hourly wage equation and the male weekly
earnings equations including the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the estimated
participation equations (27). In this parametric approach the wage equation is
identied from the exclusion of other income and the spouses characteristics as
well as from the normality assumption.18
Using the estimated wage equations we impute o¤ered wages for all individuals
in the data set. The participation frontier is then estimated using a probit, which
includes other income, the imputed wages, time e¤ects, age and education.
The likelihood function for female labor supply when the man is working is and
when there are nW such observations
LogLW =
PnW
i=1f1(hfit < 0)logPr(pmit > 0; hfit < 0)+
1(hfit > 0)
h
logPr(pmit > 0) + logf(h
f
itjpmit > 0)
i
g
(28)
When the man is not working (nN observations) this becomes
LogLN =
PnN
i=1f1(hfit < 0)logPr(pmit < 0; hfit < 0)+
1(hfit > 0)
h
logPr(pmit < 0) + logf(h
f
itjpmit < 0)
i
g
(29)
In the above f() represents the conditional normal density function and 1(a) is
the indicator function which is equal to one when a is true and zero otherwise.
The labor supply estimates that are obtained from this procedure do not satisfy
exactly the assumptions of the collective (or the unitary) model. We can then carry
17The changing coe¢ cient on other income is not implied directly by the structure of the model
(and it is not necessary for identication purposes). We allow this as an extra degree of exibility.
18We tested for zero skewness in both the male earnings equation and in the female log hourly
wage equation, taking into account the selection. The t-statistics were 1.93 and 1.38 respectively
Hence the hypothesis is accepted in both cases.
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Figure 1: Proportion of married men and women employed by year
out a test of the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients can be rationalized using the
unitary model and/or the collective model and derive the structural estimates.
3.4 Basic facts in the data and the wage equations
For this group of households there have been large changes in the male participation
rates. On the other hand, participation has been relatively steady over these years
for married women without children. This is shown in Figure 1. Male participation
has dropped for most age groups across cohorts to a greater or lesser extent but
is most larger for those over the age of 50, which is generally interpreted as an
increase in early retirement. In gure 2 we show the life-cycle participation. Each
line represents a separate date of birth cohort. The vertical distance between the
lines shows the decline across cohorts and this is particularly pronounced at older
ages. Declines in participation take place from about the age of 40 (see also Meghir
and Whitehouse, 1997).
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Figure 2: Male Participation over the life-cycle by cohort
The wage equations include age and years of education interacted with time.
The participation equation contains in addition the education of both partners
and other household income excluding any welfare benets, all interacted with
time. The p-values for all the female education terms in the male participation
equation is 0.44% while just for the male education-time interactions the p-value
is 1.5%. The male education terms in the female participation equation have a
joint p-value of 0.62% and the time interactions alone 1.4%. The p-value for the
unearned income terms in both participation equations is indistinguishable from 0
although there is less evidence that the e¤ect varies over time since the p-value for
the unearned income-time interactions is 15% in the male participation equation
and 18% in the female one.
The e¤ects of correcting for selection on aggregate predicted wages over time can
be seen in Figure 3 for females (real log hourly wages) and in Figure 3.4 for males
(real weekly wage in levels). In both cases participation evidently biases observed
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wages upwards quite substantially. However only male wage growth is biased by
selection. This is due to the large changes in the composition of the male labour
force as participation declined. The selection correction rate for women is about
8% throughout. For men it is about 5% in the earlier period when participation
rates were higher and increased to about 10% when rates were lower. The high
level of selection correction for men is consistent with the fact the least skilled
dropped out of the labour
market.
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The non-labour (or unearned) income measure we use is dened as total non-
durable consumption minus earnings of the male and the female partner (Blundell
and Walker, 1986 or Arellano and Meghir, 1992) The measure does not su¤er from
all the problems associated with measuring unearned or asset income and thus is
less prone to measurement error. We should however treat it as endogenous and
thus use predicted other income. The reduced form uses measured asset income
as the key instrument, not including any welfare benets. The reduced form is
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Figure 3: Actual and o¤ered real log hourly wages for females by year
presented in the Appendix.
We now turn to the distribution of hours of work for those working. Women can
be found working any number of hours from 1 to 55 and this can be seen in Figure
4. Hours of work for women with non-working husbands are on average lower by
three hours and more dispersed. Men in contrast rarely if ever work below 35 hours
a week (see gure 5) and the distribution of their hours is very similar whether
the female is working or not. For example the respective means are (standard
deviations) are 42.7 (8.6) and 42.9 (9.1).19 We have also found in another data set
information on weeks employed during the year. Of those working, 90% work 52
weeks per year. This measure unfortunately ignores holidays, but this is unlikely to
19The reported histograms are for the whole sample period. The concentration beyond 35
hours is a feature in all years. Averages of male and female hours conditional on participation
are quite stable over the period. Conditional standard deviations for women have increased a bit
possibly reecting the increased wage inequality. For men there has been an increase in the rst
few years. From then on the standard deviation of hours has not displayed any trend although
it does uctuate substantially from year to year.
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Figure 4: Female Hours of Work by male participation status
add much variability since these are quite standard. Moreover in the UK temporary
layo¤s are non-existent. Thus even in an annual dimension men seem to work full
time or not at all. These facts motivated us to concentrate on the work - no work
decision for males and not on their hours dimension; the actual hours outcome for
males is an important question but we believe it relates to longer term occupational
choices. The evidence that the distribution is not a¤ected by female participation
does not contradict the hypothesis that male hours conditional on participation are
predetermined. Thus we leave the question of incorporating continuous variation
of male hours above the 35 threshold for future research. Finally, average hours
for workers uctuate over time between 32 and 34 hour, but there is no apparent
trend up or down. Neither is there any change in the shape of the distribution of
hours of work.
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Figure 5: Male Hours of Work by female participation status
3.5 Testing the Unitary and Collective Models
The unrestricted male participation and labour supply estimates are presented in
Table 2 in Appendix B. We impose a zero correlation between the participation
equation and the labor supply equations in the two regimes (male works and male
does not work). This was done since these correlations were very close to zero and
insignicant.20 All equations include a full set of time dummies as well as male
education and the age of both partners. The standard errors have been computed
using the bootstrap and allowing for the fact that male and female wages as well
as unearned income are predicted.
The own wage e¤ect for female labour supply is positive, and larger when the
male does not work. The interpretation of this, based on the collective model, is
that when he does not work a marginal increase in her wage is appropriated to a
20The correlation between male participation and female hours for working men is -0.016 (se
0.039). For non working men it is 0.044 (se 0.023).
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greater extent by her than when he does work. The income e¤ect is negative and
again larger (in absolute value) when he does not work. Interestingly the e¤ect
of male wages on female labour supply when he does not work is positive with a
p-value of 9.2% which, considering the low sample sizes for the case when the male
does not work is quite a signicant e¤ect. This contradicts the standard unitary
setting, but is implied by the collective model. Using minimum distance to jointly
test this restriction together with the income pooling restriction (see 25 I) and the
restriction on income e¤ects (26 I ) has a joint p-value of 2.8%, clearly rejecting
the unitary model.
On the other hand the two collective model restrictions (24) have a joint p-
value of 43% making them acceptable.21 We next impose the restrictions using
unweighted minimum distance. The restricted estimates are presented in Table 1.
These are estimates that satisfy the restrictions from the collective model, and
from which it is possible to derive the sharing rule and the structural female labor
supply and male participation frontier. The latter will be a function of her wage
and the other income she has access to.
As such, however, the estimates in Table 1 exhibit interesting patterns. The
way the sign of the male wage e¤ect on female labour supply changes with his
work status is particularly noteworthy and can be given a bargaining interpre-
tation: When he works, his wage has a negative inuence on her labor supply.
This is the standard income e¤ect, operating through intrahousehold transfers: a
increase in male wages, when the husband is working, augments the households
total income, and part of the enrichment is transferred to the wife. This income
e¤ect is large enough to dominate bargaining e¤ects; note, in particular, that the
e¤ect of an increase in his wage when he works has the same sign as an increase
21The rst restriction gives a value of 1:69 with a standard error of 3.38. The second restriction
is much tighter with a value of -0.29 and a standard error of 0.20.
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Female Labour Supply - Restricted Estimates
Male Works Male out of work
male wage -0.708 0.341 1.872 1.353
Fem. log wage 7.269 1.660 11.108 7.971
other inc -1.183 0.138 -1.974 0.359
Asymptotic standard errors in italics
Table 1: Restricted labour Supply estimates
in the households non labor income, whether he works or not.22 However, when
he is not working, the income e¤ect vanishes. The only consequence of a wage in-
crease is a change in respective bargaining powers, which must favor the husband.
Consequently, we expect that he will attract a larger fraction of the (unchanged)
household resources, and, by the same income e¤ect as before, her labor supply
should now increase. This intuition is exactly conrmed by the data. In addition
the female wage e¤ect is lower when he works than when he does not. The col-
lective model interprets this as follows: When he works, for every pound that she
earns she has to transfer an amount to him. This amount is lower when he does
not work. Thus when he does not work an increase in the wage gives her a larger
incentive to increase hours of work. This is an implication of equations (4), (8) and
(11). It is particularly noteworthy that the patterns described above are present
in the unrestricted estimates and have not been produced simply as a result of
imposing the restrictions.
22That an increase in total non labor income should necessarily be distributed between members
is a standard consequence of Nash-bargaining; see Chiappori and Donni (2005).
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3.6 The Estimates of the Collective Model
After imposing the restrictions above we check if a solution for the sharing rule
exists. This depends on whether the quadratic equation
2 + ( ay   Am + am)+ Amay   amAy = 0 (30)
has a solution for  (see Proposition 1). One, two or no solution may exist to 30.23
In our case the estimates imply two solutions. Generically, only at most one of
the solutions implies an integrable well behaved female labor supply. The solution
shown below is the one that satises Slutsky negativity as well as assumption R.
The female labor supply implied by the estimates in the two samples we use is,
up to a unidentied constant 24
hf = f+ 21:43 logwf   3:59yf
(25:57) (1:05)
(31)
where yf is the other income allocated to the female member of the household,
after the male has been allocated his consumption. The income e¤ect is precisely
estimated but the female wage e¤ect is badly determined. The implied wage elas-
ticity is 0.66 while the income elasticity is 0.73, both evaluated at sample means.
This labor supply satises the integrability conditions of individual utility maxi-
mization, which of course is a requirement of the theory.
The estimates of the labour supply function and the participation frontier can
be used to derive the implied sharing rules for when the husband works and when
he does not. This is of course a unique element of our approach, since it directly
relates to the distribution of resources within the household. For couples with a
23Existence thus requires an additional (inequality) constraint that is veried here.
24In the equations that follow asymptotic standard errors are reported in brackets below the
estimated coe¢ cients.
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working husband and for the two samples we consider these are
	 = 1 + 0:81wm   3:93 logwf + 0:67y
(0:097) (6:87) (0:104)
(32)
Thus an extra unit in male earnings implies an increase in his consumption by
0.80 units. He keeps 0.67 of a unit increase in household unearned income and he
transfers 0.39 of a unit to her when her hourly wage rate increases by 10% (0.1 of
a log point precisely), although this e¤ect is not well determined. The sharing rule
when he is not working is given by
F (	) = 0 + 0:68 (0:81wm   3:93 logwf + 0:67y)
(0:19) (0:097) (6:87) (0:104)
(33)
and implies that al marginal increases get compressed by 68%.
Thus the upshot of these results is that when he works, each tend to keep
the larger part of marginal increases in their respective incomes and they share
almost equally increases in unearned income, with him getting a bit extra. When
he does not work he still obtains increases in consumption as his labour market
opportunities improve but reduced to 68% of the previous values. The recent
decline in male participation would have reduced overall resources for households
but would also imply a shift in available resources towards the woman.
Finally, the implied participation frontiers based on the estimates for the two
samples is
wrm = m + 0:29y   1:69 logwf
(0:21) (2:64)
(34)
but unfortunately the estimates are badly determined.
Since his consumption grows with other income, increases in the latter increase
his reservation wage. However, increases in her wage reduce his consumption and
hence make it more likely that he works.
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4 The Extension to Public Goods and Household
Production
4.1 The Extension to Public goods
Recent results show that an extension of the model to public consumption
is feasible, although it may require additional information and/or particular as-
sumptions. Not only are the main conclusions of the private good setting (i.e.,
identication and testability) preserved in the extended framework, but the cur-
rent model can be interpreted, in this perspective, as the reduced form of the
general problem, the emphasis being put here on private consumptions only. Al-
though these developments are outside of the scope of the present paper, and will
be the topic of future empirical investigations, one can indicate the general avor
of these extensions. We summarize the state of knowledge in this area which can
be found in references made below and in Chiappori, Blundell and Meghir (2001).
There are several ways of introducing public consumption within the collective
model. The simplest manner, and perhaps the most natural one in the absence
of price variation, is to assume that the Hicksian good C is collectively consumed
- i.e., individual utilities are of the form U i(1   hi; C). In this context, one can
show (Chiappori and Ekeland, 2002 and forthcoming; Donni, forthcoming) that
the knowledge of individual labor supply functions generically allows exact identi-
cation of the structural model, i.e. preferences and Pareto weights, at least when
the number of hours is continuous (the extension to discrete participation, in the
spirit of the present paper, is left for further research).
In a more general setting, public and private consumptions can be simulta-
neously considered. Then di¢ cult identication problems arise. While prefer-
ences over the private goods can readily be identied conditional on the quantities
consumed of the public goods, general identication typically requires additional
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information or more structure. A natural solution is to assume that private con-
sumption is separable, with member is utility of the form W i [ui (1  hi; Ci) ; K]
(here K denotes public consumption, assumed observable).25 Even in the absence
of price variation (i.e., assuming that the price of both the public and the private
good are normalized to one), this model is generically identiable in a general, non-
parametric sense: the observation of labor supply and demand for public good as
(continuous) functions of wages and non labor income allows to uniquely recover
the underlying structural model. Specically, once the demand for public good is
known, then one can also recover the utility indices W i and the decision process,
as summarized by the corresponding, individual Pareto weights.26 This rst model
can be extended in di¤erent ways to include the case where the production of the
public good also requires leisure.
Finally, an interesting perspective is provided in a recent contribution by Zhang
and Fong (2000). In their model, leisure is partly private and partly public, in the
sense that member is leisure (i = m; f) can be written as Li = Lip + L where
Lip represents is private leisure and L is the common leisure of the couple. While
individual labor supplies (hence total leisures) are observable, the allocation of time
between private and public leisure is not. Under mild separability assumptions,
Zhang and Fong show the following result: if there exist a private good (at least),
the husbands and the wifes consumptions of which are independently observable,
25Note, however, that given the collective structure of the model, at the household level there
will be no separability property between membersleisure and the demand for public good.
26In practice, e¢ ciency requires that the household demand and labor supplies solve a Pareto
program of the form:
maxW 1 + (1  )W 2
under budget constraint. The outcome of the decision process (i.e., the location of the nal choice
on the Pareto frontier) is fully summarized by the Pareto weight . In addition, if the W i are
such that private and public consumptions are normal goods, then there exists an increasing,
one-to-one correspondance between the Pareto weight  and the sharing rule  (as functions of
wages and non labor income).
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then the structural model (including the allocation of leisure between private and
public time) can be fully recovered. Again, this result suggest that data on private
consumptions can help achieve identication of more general models, entailing
private and public consumptions. As an example of such private consumption, one
may think of clothing, as in Browning et al. (1996).
4.2 The Extension to Household production
In Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and Meghir (2000) we discuss the extension to
household production. The generalization we consider is the case where the pro-
duced good is privately consumed. The framework follows that proposed in Chi-
appori (1997) in which there are two leisure and two private consumption goods:
One market good c, the price of which is normalized to one, and a domestic good
x, that can be produced within the household. In the production function of the
domestic good, we allow for di¤erences in marginal productivity of labor between
members, which can account for partial specialization (time input being non zero
for each member). Also, given that quantities of the x good are not observable,
it is natural to assume that the technology exhibits constant returns to scale. A
standard issue in household production models is whether there exists a market for
good x.27 When the domestic good is marketable and when the quantity actually
purchased on the market, denoted xM , is positive, then in the decision process it
is valued at its market price which is exogenous for the household. Otherwise, we
can still dene a shadow price, ; for the domestic good, that is some endogenous,
household-specic function of wages and non labor income.
In this generalized set up, the sharing rule is shown to exist. A generalized
version of the double indi¤erence result also holds but identication is still an
27For instance, meals can be taken at home or at restaurant; one can either clean ones house
or pay a cleaning lady to perform the job; etc..
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open issue. However we can show identication in parametric cases where there
is no market and where the shadow value is a¤ected by individual preferences.
However, identication with household production requires time use data; this is
because the model is informative about the womans leisure rather than her work
time. With no household production leisure is simply the complement of hours
of work. This is no longer the case with household production where non-market
time is shared between leisure and productive activities.
An alternative approach has recently been proposed by Donni (2004), who char-
acterizes the bias arising from a misspecication of the model that omits household
production. He rst shows that, for a large class of household production technolo-
gies, the models with and without home production are empirically undistinguish-
able, although they may lead to di¤erent welfare recommendations. This negative
result must however be qualied for two reasons. First, some conclusions obtained
in the model without home production (the reducedmodel) remain valid in the
general model; for instance, the consequences of exogenous changes in non labor
incomes and distribution factors, a key aspect for policy evaluation, are the same
in both contexts, so that a welfare evaluation performed in the reduced model re-
mains valid in general (a conclusion already mentioned in Chiappori 1997). Second
and more importantly, this conclusion extends to wage variations as well, provided
that the household technology is additively separable; in that case, the reduced
model is a valid tool for welfare analysis, in the sense that any policy evaluation
based on it has general validity. For instance, a model in which men and women
perform di¤erent tasks, or one in which male supply of household work is inelastic,
can be analyzed in our framework without introducing biases.
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5 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have specied a model of family labor supply based on the
collective framework. In doing so, we have introduced two important theoretical
innovations which match the empirical evidence on labour supply: First we allow
the possibility that one or both partners do not work. Second we allow for the
possibility that one of the partners makes just a discrete work choice, i.e. to work
or not. We show that knowledge of the male participation rule and knowledge
of the female labor supply schedule, allows us to test the collective restrictions
and to recover the individual preferences as well as the rule governing sharing of
household resources, as a function of market wages and other incomes.
We use this framework to analyze family labor supply using data from 1978
to 2001. The data is not at odds with the collective model, but the unitary
model is rejected. Once we estimate the collective model we nd that female wage
elasticity is about 0.30 which is very close to the gure that earlier UK studies
have found, including work on single parents. Moreover we nd that the level of
male consumption is sensitive to wages and other income. Although he gets to
consume all the increase in his earnings, increases in the female wage and other
income lead to substantial increases in her consumption. The implication is that
the improvement in the labor market conditions for women over the last two or
more decades would have translated to signicant improvements in their relative
welfare. The paper concludes by considering two possible extensions of the basic
framework: household public goods and household production, and we argue that
in many cases the conclusions of our reducedmodel still apply.
Appendices
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A Proof of Proposition 1
A.1 Identication on the participation frontier
On any point on the frontier, (14) is a non-linear system of equations in
the unknowns (	wf ;	wm ;	y; F
0): The rst three equations characterize the three
unknowns 	wm ;	y and F
0. Specically, from the rst two, one gets that
	y =
1
(a b)

a  1  b
F 0

	wm =
b
(a b)

a  1  a
F 0

where
a = a(wf ; y) = A [wf ; (wf ; y); y] (35)
b = b(wf ; y) = B [wf ; (wf ; y); y] :
Replacing in the third equation in (14) gives the following equation in F 0 :
 
yba  1 + a  yb

(F 0)2 +
  b+ 1  2yba+ ya  aF 0 + b+ yba = 0
This equation must have a solution, hence the standard discriminant condition:
  2yab+ ya  b  a+ 12  4  yab+ b  a  1 + yab  yb
Conversely, assume this condition is satised. Let  (wf ; y) be a solution of the
quadratic equation above (note that there are at most two such solutions). We
know that if this function corresponds to a solution, then it is such that:
F 0 [	 (wf ; (wf ; y); y)] =  (wf ; y)
Then the partials 	wm ;	wf and 	y are identied - although, of course, on the
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frontier only. Specically, one can dene three functions K;L and M such that:
	wm [wf ; (wf ; y); y] = K (wf ; y) =
b
(a  b)

a  1  a
 (wf ; y)

	wf [wf ; (wf ; y); y] = L (wf ; y) =
wf
(a  b) y

a  1  b
 (wf ; y)

	y [wf ; (wf ; y); y] = M (wf ; y) =
1
(a  b)

a  1  b
 (wf ; y)

Now, let us consider the testable restrictions implied by these results. First,
that F 0 can be written as a function of 	 only has a consequence, namely that
wf
y
=
	wf +	wmwf
	y +	wmy
=
L+Kwf
M +Ky
=
wf
y
which implies that the function  can be written as some function of .
Moreover, 	wm ;	wf and 	y are the partials of the same function. This implies
the following condition:
Ly  Mwf = yKwf   wfKy
Since the functions K;L;M and  are exactly identied from the functions a; b and
; these two equations are testable restrictions upon the latter functions. Finally,
the quadratic equation dening  may have two solutions. But, generically, one
(at most) will satisfy the two conditions above. In addition, the function F is
identied up to an additive constant.
In summary: the function 	 and function F are identied up to an additive
constant on the male participation frontier.
A.2 Identication outside the frontier
We now consider the general problem of identifying the sharing rule o¤ the
participation frontier. Let us start by the participation set P when the female
participates (hf > 0). We will assume that for all (wf ; y): a(wf ; y):y(wf ; y)+1 6=
0: Under this assumption we have:
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Lemma 4 On P , 	 is identied up to an additive constant.
Proof. We know that 	 must satisfy the partial di¤erential equation (5), i.e.:
 	wm + A	y = A  1 (36)
In addition, the values of the partials on the frontier have been identied above.
The basic idea, now, is that the latter provide boundary conditions for the partial
di¤erential equation. From standard theorems in partial di¤erential equation the-
ory, this denes 	 (up to an additive constant) provided the following condition is
fullled. First, remark that, at any point on the frontier, (36) can be written as :
r	:~u = A  1
where r	 denotes the gradient of 	, and ~u is the vector (0; 1; A)0. Now, the
condition is that ~u is not tangent to the frontier L. Since the equation of L is :
wm   (wf ; y) = 0
and given that, on the frontier, A coincides with a, this condition states that, for
all (wf ; y) :
a(wf ; y):y(wf ; y) + 1 6= 0 (37)
If this relation is fullled on the frontier, then the PDE (5), together with the
boundary condition, denes 	 up to an additive constant.
Practically, there are cases where the PDE can be solved analytically. Then the
solution is dened up to a function of 2 variables; and this function is identied
by its values upon the frontier. The next section provides an example on a specic
functional form. Even when the PDE cannot be solved analytically, it is always
possible to numerically compute 	 using the PDE and the boundary condition on
the frontier. See Appendix A for the detail of the algorithm.
In the non-participation set (N), the approach is exactly the same :
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Lemma 5 Assume that, for all (wf ; y) :
b(wf ; y):y(wf ; y) + 1 6= 0 (38)
Then on N , 	 is identied up to an additive constant.
Proof. As above, using the PDE
 	wm +B	y =
B
F 0
(39)
(remember that F 0 has been exactly identied above).
Note, incidentally, that generically both (36) and (38) are fullled almost
everywhere on the frontier.
For any (arbitrary) value of the constant, the equations (4) and (8) allow to
recover the Marshallian demand H; then preferences can be identied in the usual
way. Finally, note that integration requires at that stage additional restrictions.
While Slutsky symmetry is not binding with only two goods, the sign of compen-
sated own price elasticity still has to be positive, a constraint that can readily be
veried.
To see the intuition underlying the restrictions of the collective model note that
they reect the fact that wages have three e¤ects. Two are the familiar income and
substitution e¤ects of price (or wage) changes. The third e¤ect, which is specic to
the collective model, is that any wage (or income) variation may a¤ect the sharing
rule (say, through its impact on bargaining power). The nature of the collective
approach is that this latter e¤ect is not restricted. However, any given change in
the sharing rule must impact on a members labor supply in the same way whatever
the origin of the change. This, together with the fact that the sharing rule a¤ects
the disposable income of both agents, generates the restrictions implied by the
collective setting.
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B Unrestricted Estimates
In Table 2 we present the estimates of male participation and female labour supply
by male work status. To estimate these we rst estimate a male earnings equation,
a female log wage equation and an unearned income equation. The wage equations
include age and age2 and education of that individual interacted with time dummies
and are corrected for selection using a reduced form participation equation which
depends on the age and education of both partners and on asset income. Unearned
income is dened by unearned income = consumption  female earnings male
earnings: The unearned income equation used to predict it includes age and age2,
education of both partners and asset income all interacted with time as well as
a dummy for whether the individual has any asset income and a polynomial of
asset income. The excluded instruments in all equations are highly signicant.
These reduced forms are available upon request from the authors. Once we obtain
predicted unearned income and selectivity corrected wages for both partners we
estimate a probit for male participation and tobits for female labour supply by male
work status. We originally estimated jointly allowing for endogenous selection
of work status regime. However the correlation coe¢ cient was very small and
insignicant and we set it to zero to improve overall precision. All equations in
Table 2 include a full set of time dummies. The standard errors taking into account
the entire estimation process have been computed using the bootstrap.
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